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Background  
Zimbabwe’s LEP includes closer ties with Indonesia, India, Iran, 
Malaysia, North Korea, but China stands out as the major ally. 
Owing to the long-standing relationship between China and 
Zimbabwe, the latter speaks glowingly of China as an “all 
weather friend” (Scoones, 2016). When the Chinese head of 
state Xi Jinping visited Harare in 2015, he summed up the 
relationship as a special one that had withstood the test of time. 
It is in light of such an evolving and strengthening relationship 
that China represents Zimbabwe’s biggest foreign investor after 
the African country’s estrangement from the West, arguably 
caused by the West’s disapproval of Zimbabwe’s human rights 
record, flagrant corruption as well as Zimbabwe’s accusations of 
the West (particularly the United Kingdom) trying to colonise 
and invade Zimbabwe yet again. In 2013 alone, China 
contributed over US$ 600 million (Sun, 2016); while between 
January and November 2015, China further contributed at least 
US$ 46.5 million in FDI (Sunday News Online, 2016). In 
addition, in December 2015 while on a two-day state visit, 
President Xi said China would provide Zimbabwe with a US$ 1.2 
billion loan to rehabilitate and expand Zimbabwe’s coal-fired 
Hwange power plan. 
In the same vein, it is significant to note that China-Zimbabwe 
relations include diplomatic support, socio-cultural ties, 
economic, trade and technical cooperation and close military 
ties. Over the past decade, China has offered loans, aid, 
concessions, grants, expertise, technical and hands-on 
assistance in agriculture, mining, agro-processing, bio-fuels, 
telecommunications, water and sanitation, energy and in 
infrastructure development. To date, China has funded notable 
projects including the construction of a national defence college, 
the Harare Water Treatment Project and expansion of the 
Kariba Hydro Power Station among other major projects. This 
has benefited both countries economically and diplomatically, 
with Zimbabwe also offering diplomatic support in various 
international forums, as well as the provision of much needed 
natural resources (including gold, diamonds, platinum, chrome 
and nickel).  
Through a gesture of deepening co-operation between Beijing 
and Harare, Zimbabwe's Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa 
added the yuan to the Zimbabwean multi-currency regime. 
Since the deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy in 2008, 
which was punctuated with hyper-inflation coupled with cash 
shortages, Harare opted for the use of the Botswana pula, 
South African rand, Australian dollar, US dollar, Chinese yuan 
and the euro. This move was aimed at easing the challenge of 
cash shortages. Analysts, however, note that the adoption of 
the yuan by Harare was a reciprocal gesture of gratitude to 
Beijing, after the latter agreed to write off the former’s debt, 
which hovered at around US$ 40 million (Ramani, 2016).  
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In 2003, Zimbabwe formally announced the Look East Policy (LEP) in the face of economic 
sanctions by the West. This, coupled with the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) of 
2000, has strengthened trade and bi-lateral investments between Zimbabwe and China. China 
is increasingly involved in Zimbabwe’s agriculture, mining, construction and tourism industries. 
There is also an influx of Chinese entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe’s retail industry. The repercus-
sions of the LEP have been mixed. In this policy brief, we critically engage with three sectors: 
agriculture, mining and the informal sector; in order to provide an overview of the effects that 
LEP has had on Zimbabwe focusing on the period 2010-2016. We also propound some recom-
mendations for more positive outcomes in the future. 
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China-Zimbabwe trade and bi-lateral investments (2010
-2016)  
There has been an increase in bi-lateral investments and trade 
during the period 2010-2016. In 2010, the two nations 
celebrated 30 years of relations and over US$ 560 million in bi-
lateral trade (Thompson, 2012). During a two-day state visit to 
Zimbabwe in December 2015, Xi Jinping struck a series of mega 
deals in the energy, telecommunications and infrastructure 
sectors with Robert Mugabe (however, despite speaking 
glowingly about these deals, they are yet to materialise as to 
date). In a follow-up to the 2015 visit, there has been a steady 
rise in the bi-lateral trade between Harare and Beijing. For 
instance, in 2016, Xi upped the FDI to US$ 4 billion from a 
previous low of US$ 500 million in 2015 (Chung, 2016). In a 
context where there is little in terms of external support besides 
from China, this is seen as significant support that has kept the 
country afloat in the wake of a near economic collapse.  
Agriculture  
The Zimbabwean agriculture industry has benefitted a great 
deal, particularly the tobacco farming sector. The entry of the 
Chinese firm Tian Ze, into the Zimbabwean tobacco industry, 
has transformed that sector. Tian Ze first entered the market in 
2005 and immediately increased the price for tobacco from a 
meagre US$ 1.61 to US$ 3.32/kg. This significantly helped the 
viability of over 8,000 growers with over a million dependents 
(Mutenga, 2014). Tian Ze’s 2014 average price for auction floor 
buys stood at 55.3 per cent higher than the national average 
price. In return, Zimbabwe has also benefited through acquiring 
agricultural and irrigation equipment from China, including 
tractors. This has helped in revolutionising and modernising 
Zimbabwe’s agriculture. Additionally, Debont Co. Ltd, a Chinese 
agricultural company, is currently running Zimbabwe’s Gwebi 
Agricultural Demonstration Centre (FOCAC, 2016). Debont 
signed an agreement with Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture in 
January, through which they will partner 8 agricultural colleges 
for the expansion of the demonstration centre. Approximately 
10,000 farmers are expected to be trained to use the farming 
facilities provided by Debont. The facilities include solar powered 
irrigation systems to cope against adverse weather patterns 
(FOCAC, 2016).  
Mining  
The involvement of China in Zimbabwe’s mining industry has 
had negative repercussions. China, with the help of the 
Zimbabwean government, has played a significant role in 
depleting Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth such as diamonds from the 
eastern part of the country, where local diamond miners were 
forcefully removed to make room for Chinese companies, 
resulting in little benefits (if any at all) for the locals. The case of 
the Chiadzwa diamonds is one classic example. Chinese mining 
companies e.g. Anjin investments (a joint venture between 
Chinese Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company (Afec) 
and Matt Bronze who represents government interests in the 
company on a 50-50 shareholding basis) employ local people in 
the Marange community. Working conditions have been 
reported as deplorable, including poor remuneration, physical 
abuse and lack of protective clothing (My Zimbabwe, 2016).   
Chinese companies have failed to adhere to the principles of 
good corporate social responsibility to the extent that the local 
community was left economically worse off than it was before 
the discovery of diamonds, followed by the subsequent entry of 
Chinese companies in the diamond extraction. Local diamond 
interests coupled with recent outbursts by President Mugabe 
accusing Chinese mining companies of siphoning diamond 
money and not banking with local Zimbabwean banks, are 
pressuring Chinese diamond companies to surrender more of 
their market share to local companies. In 2016, a total of US$ 
15 billion was reported as ‘lost’ by Zimbabwe in the mining 
sector (The Standard, 2016). This however, is not to be solely 
blamed on the Chinese. The diamond mining sector has 
traditionally been shrouded in obscurity from ordinary citizens. 
For instance, the finance ministry expected to receive US$ 600 
million from the diamond industry but only received US$ 43 
million (Global Witness, 2014). As such, China’s presence in 
Zimbabwe has not meaningfully improved the livelihoods of the 
ordinary Zimbabwean. 
In April 2016, Zimbabwe effected an indigenisation law requiring 
foreign companies with over US$ 500,000 in assets to transfer 
or sell 51 per cent of their stake to indigenous Zimbabweans 
(Sun, 2016). Initially, Chinese companies were exempted from 
the indigenisation policy when it was launched in 2008 (Ramani, 
2016). Under the indigenisation, Chinese mining companies are 
now required to operate under the Zimbabwe Consolidated 
Diamond Company. In 2015, Anjin appealed to the supreme 
court to challenge the legality of the such monopoly. As such, 
the passing of into law of the 51 per cent stake requirement has 
strained relations between Harare and Beijing. The Zimbabwean 
government argues they are not getting enough revenue from 
Chinese companies while the Chinese companies loathe the 
monopoly created by the indigenisation policy.  
Tourism  
The tourism industry is one of the sectors in which Sino-
Zimbabwe relations have thrived. The Zimbabwe Tourism 
Authority (ZTA) claims that the first quarter of 2016 recorded a 
107 per cent increase to 4,043 Chinese tourists from a 2015 
figure of 1,952 (Xinhua, 2016). The ZTA report cites China as 
the second biggest tourist source market after Japan whose 
visitors figure during the same period stood at 4,303 (Xinhua, 
2016). Zimbabwe seeks to further cement this relationship as a 
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China friendly destination by hosting the first ever China-Africa 
Tourism Conference in 2017. The conference will be hosted by 
the ZTA in collaboration with the Chinese Friendly International, 
a Chinese think-tank (Zimbabwe Tourism, 2016).   
The move by the ZTA is key as it comes at a time when Chinese 
arrivals have been in decline in the country. The number of 
Chinese tourists in Zimbabwe fluctuated in the past three years. 
The government of Zimbabwe has responded to the decline by 
scrapping visa requirements for Chinese tourists. In 2015, a 46 
per cent decline resulted in 6,925 arrivals, in sharp in contrast to 
12,927 arrivals in 2014. The 2015 arrivals fall short of the 2011 
figure, which stood at 30,549 Chinese arrivals (Zimbabwe 
Tourism, 2016). However, due to the scrapping of visa 
requirements for Chinese citizens has as previously mentioned 
resulted in a steady increase of Chinese tourists in 2016. These 
developments come at a time when other African countries 
(South Africa, Egypt, Angola, Tanzania and Kenya) are 
benefitting from a consistent destination promotion through a 
visible market presence in China. These African countries 
continue to record significant increase in arrivals from the 
Chinese market. 
Construction  
Zimbabwe’s construction sector has witnessed an increased 
presence of Chinese firms especially since the country’s liquidity 
crunch. In August 2016, China pledged US$ 46 billion towards 
the construction of a new Zimbabwean parliament (Ramani, 
2016). The pledge for the construction of a new parliament 
follows a recent string of business contracts between Harare 
and Beijing. Subsequent to the contracts, China has opened its 
markets to Zimbabwean farm products, expanded its 
investments in Zimbabwe’s housing and agriculture sectors, and 
lent Zimbabwe money to upgrade its medical equipment in inner
-city hospitals. Chinese contractors serve as an anchor for the 
country’s construction sector. The National Defence College, 
Long Cheng Plaza in Belvedere and the National Sports Stadium 
are among the major projects completed by Chinese companies 
(Zimbabwe Situation, 2013). The construction, however, has 
been carried out with little to no local sector participation at all.  
Additionally, there are incidents of Chinese companies with 
questionable credentials getting tenders from the Zimbabwean 
government. For instance, China Harbour Engineering Company 
LTD (CHEC) was recently awarded a US$ 2 billion tender for the 
dualisation of the Chirundu-Beit bridge road project; yet the 
company is currently blacklisted by the World Bank for fraud 
and corruption. Their financier specialises in military work, not 
construction work. CHEC has also attracted controversy in 
Uganda and other countries for shady deals (Moyo, 2016). The 
Zimbabwean government is at fault as they have the 
responsibility of awarding construction tenders. 
China in Zimbabwe’s informal economy context: impact 
on local informal entrepreneurs    
Since the turn of the millennium, a combination of factors, 
which include Zimbabwe’s economic policies coupled with 
acrimonious relations between the government and the West, 
have resulted in an unprecedented economic meltdown in this 
Southern African country. For instance, in June 2008, the 
inflation rate stood at 11. 2 million per cent a year, while in July 
of the same year the figures rose to a figure twenty times 
higher (Berger, 2008). This rapid rise in inflation was 
accompanied by high unemployment rates and a manifestation 
of the informal economy as the immediate safety net for most 
urban households, due to the closure of most private companies 
and industries.  
As of 2013, 3.7 million Zimbabweans were involved in the 
informal sector, with females accounting for 54.6 per cent of 
that figure (Bulawayo, 2013). As such, the informal sector has 
become a safe haven, a means of wealth creation and livelihood 
construction for the average Zimbabwean, most notably through 
vending, including the buying and selling of fruits, vegetables, 
clothing and foreign currency dealing.  
Suffice to say, while the government has unreservedly praised 
its ties with China, very little has trickled down to the general 
Zimbabwean populace. Local Zimbabweans view the Chinese 
with scepticism and they perceive the latter as bringing no 
benefits other than to themselves and the government. 
However, this claim is not entirely true, as Zimbabwe has 
benefited from imports in agricultural machinery (tractors), 
electrical, leather, shoes, clothing and textile, engine, 
telecommunications, household appliances and kitchenware 
among other goods. 
In the wake of such huge volumes of imports from China, local 
Zimbabwean investors and ordinary citizens complain of China 
dumping cheap, sub-standard commodities into local markets, 
resulting in derogatory terms being coined to describe these 
goods, the most prominent of which is ‘zhing-
zhong’ (Thompson, 2012). This has posed stiff competition 
among the local infant industries in Zimbabwe with the Chinese. 
However, given the fact that the Chinese sell their products 
cheaply, the local Zimbabwean industry has suffered inasmuch 
as it has failed to compete and survive under such a business 
climate.  
Despite these criticisms, credit is due to the Chinese for helping 
the Zimbabwean people through the worst of the political crisis 
through the provision of affordable goods (Brautigam, 2012). 
Chinese business companies brought cheap goods and bailed 
out poor locals against skyrocketing inflation (Shelton and 
Kabemba, 2012).  
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Conclusion 
It is likely that Zimbabwe will continue its strong relationship 
with China. This is notwithstanding, the fact that it is China that 
stands to benefit more from interaction with Zimbabwe in terms 
of natural resource wealth extraction and trade, as compared to 
the little financial aid being poured into Zimbabwe by Beijing. 
The evolvement of Sino–Zimbabwe relations will however, 
remain a matter of strategic interests at play. In this regard, it is 
noteworthy to highlight that the Chinese government has of late 
been reluctant to commit to financial investment given the 
political climate in the country. The recent introduction of the 
Indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe has also negatively affected 
Chinese companies particularly in the mining industry.  
Recommendations 
 In South-South cooperation, China has the upper hand, 
as it tends to be ahead of African countries in terms of 
technological capacities. Chinese investments are 
necessary but the areas of capital injection seem to be in 
the extractive industries (agriculture and mining), which 
have seen more export of raw materials than value-
added products (Berhe and Liu eds., 2013). The 
disadvantage is that raw materials are cheaper than the 
‘value added’ products that China in turn sells back to 
Zimbabwe and Africa in general. In order for Zimbabwe 
to benefit more substantially, it needs to increase its 
exporting capacity, with China backing it up. The focus 
on primary raw materials derails Zimbabwe’s comparative 
advantage and reproduces the same relationship of 
dependency that the country has had before with the 
West. The Government of Zimbabwe should negotiate 
with China so that it transfers technology and imparts 
skills to the country to avoid perpetual dependency, 
while at the same time limiting Chinese involvement to 
those industries in which locals lack expertise and 
technical knowhow. 
 Industries where locals can engage, such as the case of 
small-scale gold mining, should be reserved for locals. 
Stakeholder consultation may also help common 
Zimbabweans who may have business interests in China. 
For now, it appears the LEP and Zimbabwe’s 
engagement with China is an ‘elite reserve’ to the 
detriment of local livelihoods. Participation of locals in 
decision making regarding Zimbabwe’s engagement with 
China could go a long way in helping local entrepreneurs 
benefit from the relationship. 
 Zimbabwean entrepreneurs and investors should 
reciprocally invest in China in order to create a more 
balanced form of engagement. There is need for 
measures/policies that will promote a significant market 
presence for Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in China, in 
order for the China-Zimbabwe to be a win-win one that 
also benefits ordinary Zimbabweans.   
 In order to avoid overreliance on China, Zimbabwe 
should take a cue from the Chinese themselves, who 
have a vast network of markets and trade relations 
including the West. In light of this, Zimbabwe should 
reconsider its lack of engagement with the West. In fact, 
Zimbabwe should not only look East nor West but should 
look everywhere. 
Nuša Tukić  
Research Analyst   
Centre for Chinese Studies 
Stellenbosch University 
Felix Tombindo 
Unit of Zimbabwean Studies 
Sociology Department  
Rhodes University 
